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Historical assessments of the 1907 Hague Peace Conference, like its 1899 predecessor, are usually 
framed in verdicts of success or failure. Although some specialist accounts rightly portray the Hague 
meetings as both successful and important, most analyses of the period emphasize their shortcomings, 
not least the failure to prevent war in 1914. This article interrogates why the existing historiography is 
framed in this simplistic – and ultimately misleading – success/failure dichotomy. Focusing on hopes 
and aspirations regarding disarmament ahead of the 1907 Hague Conference, it contends that 
networks of European and American citizen activists, by doing so much to bring the conference about 
and legitimizing disarmament as a topic for diplomatic discussion, ensured that immediate verdicts of 
the conference’s work focused on the (practically non-existent) outcomes in this domain. This lack of 
progress overshadowed all other accomplishments of the second Hague conference and established, 
well before 1914, a prevailing narrative of failure. 
 
The 1907 Hague Peace Conference was, in many ways, a significant step forward from that 
which had met eight years earlier. It was certainly bigger and more international: twenty-six 
countries were represented in 1899, twenty of them European; forty-four countries 
participated in 1907, including seventeen from Latin America and three from Asia. Yet in 
spite of its greater size, the 1907 conference is viewed, if anything, less sympathetically than 
its predecessor. Despite recent attempts to reassess the legacies of both conferences, little has 
altered in the sixteen years since Nigel Brailey’s observation that the Hague gatherings are 
generally seen as “little more than a footnote en route to the 1914-18 war.”1 The temptation 
to understate the significance of the two conferences, and the 1907 conference in particular, is 
forgivable. Many of the original aims in 1899 went unfulfilled, especially with regard to arms 
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limitation (although the establishment of a Permanent Court of Arbitration was a tangible 
accomplishment). The 1907 gathering, though larger and longer-lasting (four months’ 
duration rather than two) than 1899, achieved relatively little. Some progress was made by 
accepting the principle of obligatory arbitration. Furthermore, that the 1899 gathering was 
reprised and expanded served to consolidate the conviction that regular conferences thereafter 
would deliver incremental and substantial progress.2  Yet despite these positives, the 
shortcomings of the 1907 conference are all too apparent: simply put, no great power was 
prepared to jeopardize its national and imperial interests by surrendering sovereignty or 
reducing its capacity for armed defense.  
 Clearly, as Margaret MacMillan has noted, there was a sizeable divergence between, 
on the one hand, a “widespread public sentiment in favor of peace” and, on the other, those in 
authority who considered war “a necessary part of international relations.” The latter, 
especially those of a conservative persuasion, saw in pacifism a “challenge to the old order,” 
a vehicle through which public opinion could restrain policymakers and undercut their ability 
to use force.3 At the same time, the perceived wishes of the masses could not be ignored. 
Politicians and diplomats were compelled to pay lip-service to such lofty aims as arms 
limitation and obligatory arbitration, to project themselves as enthusiastic members of a 
fledgling international community committed to outlawing war, and, above all, to avoid 
culpability when peace initiatives floundered. The situation had been similar in 1899 when, 
as Mark Mazower notes, most powers had attended “chiefly for fear of criticism if they did 
not.”4 Nevertheless, as Andrew Webster insists, “the weight of public opinion” in 1899 
compelled governments to accept discussion of legalistic mechanisms for the limitation of 
armaments as “a core item of international diplomacy.”5 Public opinion was expressing itself 
on a global scale, articulating what William Mulligan describes as “international law’s 
growing purchase on the public imagination.”6  
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 By and large, this demonstration of the public’s ability to influence diplomacy is 
considered a key success of the Hague initiatives.7 But this success came at a price, as the 
growing power of public opinion (as articulated by networks of citizen activists) had negative 
as well as positive ramifications. On the one hand, it helped crystallize global sentiment 
behind a progressive cause which in turn encouraged previously recalcitrant governments to 
take such issues more seriously; on the other, it widened the (already substantial) gulf 
between the demands of peace activists and what politicians and diplomats were prepared to 
countenance. By 1907, the gap between activists’ expectations and diplomats’ willingness to 
meet them had widened, especially when it came to disarmament. This had crucial 
repercussions not only for the immediate outcomes of this gathering but also for its longer-
term historical legacy. It helped set the 1907 conference up to fail, especially in terms of 
perceptions forged in its immediate aftermath. Had the conference focused on a more limited 
and realizable set of goals, it may have been possible to create the impression of achieved 
targets rather than unfulfilled hopes, and the historical verdict of the second Hague 
conference may have been more forgiving (the outbreak of the 14-18 war notwithstanding). 
This is important as it compels us to approach the 1907 conference from a different 
angle and advance an alternative analysis of its outcomes. Rather than interrogating whether 
it succeeded or failed, this article explores instead why the historiography has come to be 
dominated by this simplistic and misleading dichotomy. After all, the conference – like any 
such initiative – both succeeded and failed. Of course, the two Hague Conferences are often 
overlooked or dismissed as inconsequential because a world war erupted in 1914. It is argued 
here, however, that the narrative of failure (and, to a lesser extent, a rival analysis of success) 
emerged well before this war broke out, and first became embedded both during and 
immediately after the 1907 meeting. Moreover, a perception of failure was exacerbated by 
the free expressions of disappointment articulated by many peace activists themselves, a 
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disappointment attributable chiefly to the lack of progress made towards disarmament. 
Paradoxically, some of the conference’s pre-eminent cheerleaders succeeded only in 
undermining its accomplishments. As will be shown, it was because of the efforts of citizen 
activists, operating overwhelmingly in Western Europe and North America, that disarmament 
became almost the alpha and omega of the pre-conference expectations. Although activists 
worked in multiple directions (and much attention was focused on issues including 
arbitration, codifying the laws of war, establishing an International Prize Court, etc.), it was 
disarmament that most captured the public imagination. But public opinion now outran the 
diplomatic possibilities. Andrew Carnegie, the wealthy benefactor of so many peace 
initiatives in the early twentieth century, provided an apposite post-mortem in the immediate 
aftermath of the 1907 assembly: “Our expectations were perhaps too high.”8 
Interestingly, these heightened expectations had dissipated considerably in the 
immediate lead-up to the 1907 conference, and press coverage was certainly less upbeat than 
it had been in 1899. The Observer noted that “there is less public enthusiasm this time,” while 
the Manchester Guardian asserted that the second conference lacked the “idealist impulse of 
the first.”9 But focusing on the gloomy landscape in the weeks just prior to the conference 
fails to account for the months and years of relative optimism that preceded it. To be sure, 
much of the initial positivity emanating from the 1899 meeting had faded due to the 1899-
1902 South African war, which so cruelly exposed the shortcomings and inertia of The 
Hague system. As Calvin Davis has remarked, public interest had dropped almost as soon as 
the 1899 conference closed, the cause of world peace appearing little more than a “casual 
concern.”10 This negativity, however, was soon eclipsed by demands for another Hague 
gathering intended to augment the foundations laid in 1899 and remedy its deficiencies. Some 
even considered the inertia label inaccurate. At the 1903 Universal Peace Congress, the 
prominent Austrian peace campaigner, the Baroness Bertha von Suttner, equated pacifist 
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activism with the hands on a clock – though appearing inert, the hands move imperceptibly, 
slowly and invisibly.11 And, after a slow start, there was a flurry of bilateral arbitration 
agreements signed by Hague participants between 1903 and 1907.12 Progress became more 
perceptible, encouraging activists to step up their demands for a second conference. 
 American President Theodore Roosevelt was subjected to significant pressure. In 
1904 both the Lake Mohonk Conference on International Arbitration and a delegation 
representing the Interparliamentary Union (IPU) lobbied the President. Both organizations, 
though far from ‘pacifist’ in a doctrinal sense, shared the conviction that an enhanced spirit of 
internationalism would benefit the cause of peace. The Mohonk group always stressed that 
their gatherings were not “peace” conferences, but rather means of influencing public opinion 
by “disseminating information in regard to the progress and possibilities of arbitration.”13 It 
had, since 1895, been a growing force in lobbying prominent Americans — politicians and 
businessmen in particular — in support of international arbitration, but additional momentum 
was provided in September 1904 when the IPU convened for the first time on American soil 
(in St. Louis). Delegates demanded another Hague meeting, asserting that the substitution of 
arbitration for war would embody the wishes of “enlightened public opinion and the spirit of 
modern civilization alike.”14 Led by Congressman Richard Bartholdt, an IPU delegation 
traveled to Washington to lobby the President. On hearing the IPU’s appeal, Roosevelt stated 
that he would press ahead with stimulating another Hague congress.15 In October 1904 an 
official circular called for a second Hague gathering intended to complete what the first 
conference had left unresolved, notably by making arbitration obligatory and making 
meaningful progress in the direction of arms limitation.16   
The reception was initially warm (the more overt hostility, notably from Germany and 
Austria, was vented only later.) The British government was certainly keen, foreign secretary 
Lansdowne assuring American ambassador Joseph Choate of London’s willingness to co-
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operate with Washington “in so important a matter.”17 The immediate sticking point was 
Russia’s unwillingness to countenance another conference whilst their war with Japan was 
ongoing. Ambassador Sergey Sazonow informed the British foreign office that St. Petersburg 
was “entirely opposed” to the idea, considering the present moment “very inopportune.”18 
The Russians also wanted to preserve their status as the initiators of the Hague idea. By 1905, 
with the Japanese war concluded, they revived their interest in a second conference but 
insisted that the Tsar reprise his 1899 role as instigator-in-chief. Roosevelt, much amused by 
Russia’s convoluted efforts to persuade him to abdicate the initiative, was happy to do so, 
unwilling to become “a professional peace advocate.”19 Even so, Russia’s ability to assume 
leadership was compromised by internal unrest. As American secretary of state Elihu Root 
noted, “the poor fellows have their minds full of their own wretched internal troubles.” In this 
context, Root was pleased to see London take the initiative, Henry Campbell-Bannerman’s 
new Liberal government having swept to power in January 1906 on a platform of “Peace, 
retrenchment and reform.” Renewed impetus was necessary given how many peace activists 
were beginning to question the prudence of holding the meeting at all. The French politician 
and peace advocate, Paul d’Estournelles de Constant, warned that proceedings would end in 
“a great failure” given the current international climate. Root, however, was more sanguine. 
“[F]ailures are necessary steps towards success,” he remarked, alluding specifically to the 
prospects for disarmament, “and we might as well go ahead and meet them.”20 
 Root’s allusion to disarmament reflected how this topic began to eclipse arbitration as 
the most prominent within public discourses ahead of the 1907 conference, the new British 
government’s adhesion to the idea suggesting that a reduction of armaments was now a 
genuine possibility rather than a utopian fantasy.21 Although the Liberal’s commitment to 
disarmament was somewhat disingenuous,22 its public pronouncements had an impact. In 
December 1905 Campbell-Bannerman bemoaned the pernicious effects of untrammelled 
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spending on armaments which, he noted, exacerbated tensions overseas while starving the 
taxpayer of much-needed assistance at home.23 The Liberals’ subsequent electoral success 
can be explained, at least in part, by their promise to cut military expenditure, exploiting 
unease in the country at the Anglo-German arms race and tapping into a more latent 
opposition to war stemming from recent experiences in South Africa.24 By openly advocating 
disarmament, the Liberals revived an idea that was brushed under the carpet in 1899 and had 
latterly been proposed only by a minority of fringe pacifist groups. After the 1906 British 
election, however, and encouraged by d’Estournelles de Constant, the IPU urged its members 
to lobby their respective parliaments to embrace arms limitation, the first time the Union had 
broached this subject seriously for many years.25 In America too, the topic of disarmament 
gained traction. Carnegie even urged President Roosevelt to follow Britain’s lead by 
announcing a halt to all U.S. naval shipbuilding.26 
 Genuine hopes were thus entertained that the 1907 conference would go further than 
its 1899 precursor. In April 1906 the International Arbitration and Peace Association (IAPA) 
implored the new foreign secretary, Sir Edward Grey, to prompt a discussion of arms 
reduction at The Hague. Noting forlornly that the primary aim in 1899 – the arrest of 
armaments – had not been accomplished, they insisted that any Power proposing 
disarmament would “win the enthusiastic confidence and support of the labouring masses in 
all parts of the world.” The Peace Society also urged Grey along the disarmament path, 
suggesting that such a step would be welcomed by the mass of opinion. For the National 
Council of Peace Societies, disarmament had to be tabled in order to “fulfil the mandate of 
the General Election.”27 The importance of the Liberal’s election victory was also noted 
overseas. The 1906 Lake Mohonk Conference predicted that the “beneficial results” of the 
1899 gathering would be “equaled and perhaps surpassed,” noting with approval London’s 
commitment to disarmament and hoping that “this subject will receive careful and favorable 
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consideration.”28 The International Peace Bureau (IPB) went further, suggesting that Britain’s 
enthusiasm for arms reduction was shared “wholeheartedly” by the Italians, and even noted 
how the Kaiser had recently “recognized the great need for peace in Europe.” Current 
conditions “fill us with hope,” they continued, demonstrating that governments, “under the 
pressure of public opinion, are abandoning old mistakes.”29 
 The IPB’s buoyant view of Germany’s intentions was not entirely fabricated; in 
January 1907, the British foreign office detected an emergent “critical spirit” in official 
circles in Berlin but doubted its ability to permeate Germany’s “military crust.”30 Hopes of 
disarmament also sat uncomfortably alongside the harsh realities of European diplomacy. 
Franco-German discord was brought into sharper focus by the first Moroccan Crisis, and as 
soon as preparations began for the 1907 conference it was clear that Paris was wary and 
Berlin utterly opposed to any discussion of arms limitation. In December 1906 the French 
embassy official, Léon Geoffray, informed Grey that the Quai d’Orsay saw little point in 
raising the armaments question given Germany’s well-documented views on the matter. Grey 
acknowledged the difficulties but stressed that public opinion would lament any failure to 
take the matter seriously.31 For the British government, at least, the need to placate a 
perceived public demand compelled them to pursue avenues of discussion they knew to be 
futile. But British goodwill must not be taken for granted, and Campbell-Bannerman’s stance 
certainly exposed the Liberals to charges of hypocrisy. The need to appease sections of 
opinion alarmed by Germany’s naval build-up compelled the government to stress that 
Britain’s maritime supremacy was undiminished, reassurances that were not easily reconciled 
with the rhetoric of disarmament.32 Two contradictory demands left the government caught 
between two stools: on the one hand, Grey considered “public opinion here … so strong that 
we were bound to do our best to discuss the question of expenditure at the Hague 
Conference”; on the other, prominent navalists like Lord Esher insisted that “the public do 
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not realize the real issues and the true nature of the problem,” and that high expenditure was a 
necessity rather than a luxury.33  
Campbell-Bannerman nonetheless stuck to his guns. In a notorious article published 
in The Nation in March 1907 he argued explicitly for a serious discussion of arms limitation, 
and also sought to soothe Anglo-German tensions by proclaiming that Britain’s naval 
strength was not intended to intimidate any single other state.34 The prime minister’s 
conciliatory tone alarmed the French: Le Temps remarked caustically that the Nation article 
caused displeasure in France, irritation in Germany, and made Great Britain appear 
“ridiculous” before the entire world. The same paper later castigated the “naïve” pacifists 
who constitute, for France, a “national peril.”35 Newspapers in Germany relished the 
opportunity to quote French discontent.36 Throughout March and April 1907 reports from 
Germany and Austria indicated consistently that the press in these countries – with few 
exceptions – opposed any discussion of arms reduction. The Frankfurt Gazette noted that 
Campbell-Bannerman’s arguments “met with much opposition” in both Britain and France, 
demonstrating that “Germany is not alone responsible if lasting peace is not established.” A 
similar tone was struck in Austria, where the Sonn-und-Montags Zeitung ridiculed the “peace 
enthusiasts” who reveled in unrealizable dreams of disarmament. More importantly, this 
journal also reflected a widely-held suspicion of British intent, namely that their advocacy of 
arms reduction was a ruse intended to maintain their current naval supremacy.37 In this 
climate it is unsurprising that chancellor von Bülow’s speech in the Reichstag on April 30, 
stating categorically that Germany would not indulge in any discussion of arms limitation at 
The Hague, was received enthusiastically.38 Germany’s unequivocal stance appeared to crush 
any hopes of making progress in arms limitation before the 1907 conference had even 
begun.39 
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 German intransigence was also conveyed to those who, in early 1907, toured the 
European capitals in a bid to lay the groundwork for the Hague gathering. In his informal 
tour, the British peace activist and journalist, W. T. Stead, looking to reprise his 1899 role as 
chief propagandist for the conference (notably by publishing a dedicated newspaper, the 
Courrier de la Conférence, for its duration), acknowledged Germany’s firmly-entrenched 
opposition.40 The formal tour undertaken by the Russian international lawyer and diplomat, 
Feodor de Martens, encountered the same obduracy in Berlin and Vienna.41 In official circles, 
the topic of disarmament was, as David Stevenson remarks, “in disarray,” most Powers only 
prepared to enter into a “non-binding discussion in order to humour pacifist opinion.”42 Many 
peace activists still refused to be disheartened. For Stead, so disappointed by British actions 
in South Africa, it was appropriate that London should repair the “mischief done by the faults 
and follies of the last seven years” by ensuring that disarmament “figure conspicuously” at 
The Hague. Having spoken with Grey, Stead was convinced that the government was 
“resolved” to pursue disarmament to a satisfactory conclusion; if the immediate result was 
failure, London “would bring the subject forward again at every future conference.”43 
Potential disarmament discussions were received less warmly elsewhere: the French 
were happy to allow another country to raise the question but only to satisfy public opinion at 
home; the Italians were prepared to enter discussions but only if realistic solutions could be 
found; meanwhile, the Russians were hostile, preoccupied with recovering losses from the 
Japanese war and fearful that such talks would provoke friction in Russia’s relations with 
both Berlin and Vienna at the very moment they were seeking to build bridges. Only the 
British, the Americans, and the Spanish reserved the right to raise the subject at The Hague.44 
The prospects for disarmament looked bleak, a realization that began to permeate the ranks of 
peace enthusiasts. Many organizations continued to urge arms limitation, but few were 
confident of success. Despite being encouraged by Campbell-Bannerman to press their 
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respective Parliaments to embrace disarmament, delegates at the IPU’s 1906 conference 
resolved only that the question should feature on the Hague program rather than insisting 
upon tangible outcomes.45  
Citizen activists across Europe and North America ensured that the Second Hague 
Conference would take place and ensured further that disarmament would be discussed (at 
least in the preparatory stages), but they were powerless to overcome the persistent 
nationalistic tensions. That disarmament initiatives were unlikely to succeed was becoming 
increasingly clear by April 1907, when Andrew Carnegie hosted a Peace Congress in New 
York intended to stimulate public interest in the forthcoming Hague gathering. Many 
distinguished speakers were present, including statesmen like Grey, d’Estournelles de 
Constant and Root. All agreed that further developments in arbitration should be pursued, but 
the disarmament question proved more divisive. Secretary of State Root, speaking on behalf 
of President Roosevelt, believed that general disarmament would do “more harm than good,” 
leaving the civilized Powers “at the mercy of other peoples less advanced.” Consequently, he 
warned delegates not to expect too much from The Hague gathering.46 Others were more 
upbeat, notably Carnegie himself, who endorsed disarmament and ensured that the 
resolutions adopted by the Congress included a statement thanking Campbell-Bannerman 
“for the noble stand which he has taken in favor of … a limitation and reduction of the 
military and naval burdens now weighing upon the world.”47  
Although waning, a degree of optimism continued to percolate within public 
discourses regarding disarmament. Much of this stemmed from the apparent determination of 
the British government to ensure a discussion of the topic at The Hague. The Washington 
Post had been skeptical about disarmament in January 1907, dismissing it as “the airiest and 
thinnest of theories,” but was notably more enthusiastic by the spring, concluding that the 
forthcoming conference must tackle disarmament “whether it is agreeable to Germany or 
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not.” The same paper later lambasted the Kaiser for his apparent obstructionism, accusing 
any recalcitrant Power of seeking to “further the cause of war for its own advantage.”48 The 
New York Times concurred, and despite considering tangible outcomes in arms limitation 
unlikely, insisted that there was no reason to dodge the discussion.49 But not all papers 
agreed. Writing in the Daily Mail, the British journalist and historian H. W. Wilson argued 
that any disarmament agreement would require “an immense machinery” to ensure 
compliance, and that this constituted “a constant danger to the world’s peace” on account of it 
impinging upon national sovereignty.50 
Greater pessimism, even skepticism, became more commonplace as the conference 
neared, even amongst peace advocates. Carnegie was certainly more downbeat, comparing 
the 1907 American delegates unfavorably to those who attended in 1899, chiefly on account 
of the current crop lacking the same heartfelt commitment to peace.51 Others were 
particularly keen to downplay the chances of disarmament. Addressing the 1907 Lake 
Mohonk Conference, Nicholas Murray Butler, President of Columbia University and a 
prominent peace activist, preferred to avoid any such discussion: “Disarmament,” he 
remarked, “will follow peace as an effect not precede it as a cause.”52 Indeed, the Mohonk 
group’s decision to omit any reference to disarmament from their platform was applauded as 
realistic by the Washington Post.53 Only a fringe of more committed pacifists continued to 
believe that disarmament was a genuine possibility, their arguments frequently invoking 
public opinion’s alleged vexation with the incessant arms race. The French pacifist Léon 
Bollack penned an open letter to the 1907 Hague delegates asserting that “universal public 
opinion,” tired of “crazy” levels of arms spending and hostile to obligatory military service, 
demanded movement towards arms limitation.54 
As a more widespread belief in disarmament began to fade, the British government 
seemed hopelessly committed to raising the issue. Britain’s ambassador in Washington, 
 12 
James Bryce, noted in May that apart from the issue of disarmament, he had “heard nothing” 
from London concerning other topics for discussion.55 The American delegation identified 
two primary motivations for Britain’s apparent fixation with the topic: first, “because public 
opinion is especially strong in its favor,” and second, because the “pocketbook of the 
Englishman is touched” and any reduction in naval expenditure would have the beneficial 
side-effect of reducing taxation. It was noted, however, that London was concerned only with 
“the limitation of expenditure, not necessarily with the limitation of armament itself.”56 To be 
sure, few British officials believed a meaningful reduction of armaments to be possible. The 
Inter-Departmental Committee appointed to consider questions for discussion at the 
Conference concluded early that “the only practicable change” lay in establishing an 
international Tribunal of Appeal, essentially extending the mechanisms for arbitration put in 
place in 1899. Regarding the limitation of armaments, it was resolved that the only two 
possibilities involved establishing a cap on military spending or reducing naval construction, 
neither of which amounted to meaningful disarmament.57  
Given the clear absence of international support for such schemes, the issue of arms 
limitation had been watered down substantially by the time formal instructions were issued to 
the British delegation. As Grey informed the chief delegate, Sir Edward Fry, the British 
government wanted disarmament to feature on the agenda but harbored few illusions about 
the likelihood of success. Despite this, “it was better to have a discussion, even if it did not 
lead to a satisfactory conclusion.”58 A discussion was necessary to assuage a public demand, 
and Britain’s commitment to raising the topic meant that the Americans—under similar 
pressure from their own public—were given an escape. The United States could now be 
reactive rather than proactive, a position that suited Washington. As their Commission made 
clear, they were keen to discuss disarmament but deemed it advisable not to “father or mother 
it.”59 This was almost certainly motivated by the realization—widespread amongst delegates 
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from the outset—that little could be done. As Root remarked, “the mutual suspicion” that 
dominated European politics rendered the prospects rather bleak.60 
Growing skepticism was even apparent amongst those who had done so much 
previously to demand a discussion of disarmament. Outlining his hopes for The Hague in a 
letter to The Times on January 1, 1907, W. T. Stead omitted the subject of arms limitation 
entirely. Although full of high-minded idealism and exalted proclamations of the conference 
marking “the first Parliament of Man” and “the brotherhood of the peoples,” Stead’s vision of 
what could be realistically accomplished focused on extending arbitration rather than 
reducing armaments.61 Other publications were more forthright; an article in The Economist 
considered it “unwise” to expect progress in disarmament because the difficulties identified 
by Germany in 1899 were no less operative eight years later. Nevertheless, a later article 
acknowledged that progress might be made in the direction of arbitration.62 Indeed, it was 
arbitration rather than disarmament that dominated the opening stages of the conference when 
it opened on June 15, 1907; disarmament did not even feature on the agenda.63 The president 
of the conference, the Russian diplomat Aleksandr Nelidov, counseled the delegates against 
over-ambition, a warning that, according to The Times, may disappoint enthusiastic 
“pacifists” but was nonetheless the “language of common sense.”64 The Observer 
acknowledged the dampened aspirations but retained some optimism given the 
“comprehensive and collective purpose” of the delegates assembled in the Netherlands. The 
Manchester Guardian also identified reasons to be upbeat. Although Campbell-Bannerman 
had received “little encouragement” in his quest for arms reduction, the potential remained 
“to extend arbitration by every means in our power.”65  
Arbitration had regained the ascendancy, but even this topic frequently played second 
fiddle to complex and time-consuming discussions regarding the laws of war. Some progress 
was certainly made in the direction of arbitration, expanding slightly upon the foundations 
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established in 1899. As Randall Lesaffer reminds us, “the acceptance of the principle of 
obligatory arbitration” was a significant outcome of the second conference.66 Though not 
insubstantial, and certainly not without a longer-term impact, such advances appeared of little 
consequence at the time, especially as the pressing problems of international politics—the 
arms race, escalating international tensions, the lack of obligatory arbitration—remained 
unresolved.67 In this context, disappointment was the prevailing and understandable reflex, 
and this disappointment was amplified by the exaggerated hopes and expectations articulated 
in advance. This made the limited advances in 1907 appear anti-climactic. Only by 
positioning them within the broader context of more than a century’s worth of further 
initiatives and developments in international arbitration and arms control has the event, along 
with its 1899 precursor, enjoyed a degree of historical rehabilitation. An immediate verdict of 
failure surfaced in 1907, due in part to the fact that peace workers’ hopes for disarmament 
had been so easily and decisively crushed. 
The orthodox appraisal of failure was certainly consolidated by the outbreak of war in 
1914, but even before this the frustration of peace activists had combined with negative press 
coverage to establish a dominant (if not yet terminal) tone. As Agnes Fry noted in 1921, 
when compiling the memoirs of her father, Sir Edward, “It cannot be said that the Second 
Hague Conference had a very good press in England, or excited general interest beyond 
avowedly pacifist circles.”68 The conference was afforded considerable coverage in the 
international press,69 but the diplomats themselves remained suspicious of allowing 
newspapermen too much access to their deliberations. At a meeting of the American 
Commission in mid-June, General Horace Porter opined that delegates should “avoid all 
interviews … and give out no information during the conference,” the press instead being 
furnished official synopses. Joseph Choate (America’s chief delegate) noted that Grey was 
similarly “opposed to the presence of reporters,” fearing that the presence of newspapermen 
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“would check a free expression of opinion.” As Choate himself concluded, “open sessions 
would mean closed mouths.”70 Four days later the American Commission formally resolved 
that their position vis-à-vis publicity would be to exclude the press from official 
proceedings.71 
So, although the press did provide regular coverage of the proceedings at The Hague, 
it rarely amounted to anything more substantive than repeating information gleaned officially 
via communiqués or unofficially via Stead’s Courrier de la Conférence. As the negotiations 
dragged on, this contributed to a general lack of enthusiasm for the conference’s work. 
Despite his pivotal role in making the conference happen, Theodore Roosevelt appeared 
uninterested in the proceedings once they began. “I have not really followed things at The 
Hague” he confessed to Root in early July, suggesting that Carnegie’s peace conference at 
New York, by setting the bar too high, had proved “a real detriment” to the prospects of 
accomplishing anything tangible.72 Peace activists also expressed impatience but tended to 
blame recalcitrant politicians for failing to reflect the wishes of a global public sentiment. 
The IPB’s Albert Gobat wrote to the Belgian delegate, Auguste Beernaert, lamenting how the 
deliberations had thus far focused exclusively on the laws of war when the “the public 
opinion of all countries … expected better,” not least a meaningful effort to promote 
disarmament. The “sterile nature” of The Hague discussions, he continued, dismayed an 
emergent global public that was “no longer a negligible quantity.”73 
The sixteenth Universal Congress of Peace, meeting in Munich in mid-September, 
also celebrated what The Hague gathering represented instead of fixating on uninspiring 
outcomes. A positive note was struck by many attendees, notably German pacifists perhaps 
embarrassed by their government’s obstructionist approach at The Hague.74 Baron Edward de 
Neufville acclaimed pacifist influence in the Netherlands, praising the “remarkable job” of 
Stead and his Courrier de la Conférence which had “familiarized public opinion with the 
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pacifist movement.” The official delegates had sought the pacifist voice, and “intimate 
gatherings” comprising official and unofficial representatives “continued well into the night.” 
Their influence, he concluded, was substantial, providing a corrective to “incomplete” press 
accounts and even leading many delegates to demand instructions from their respective 
governments “more in conformity with pacifist tendencies.”75 Indeed, as in 1899, the social 
environment created by the likes of Stead, von Suttner, and others (the self-monikered Le 
Cercle Internationale) provided a fertile forum in which peace workers and official delegates 
mixed freely.76 Stead’s coverage, however, often dismayed the British foreign office, not 
least because of alleged criticisms of the British delegation’s passivity vis-à-vis disarmament. 
Grey considered these critiques unwarranted as without British efforts “the subject of 
armaments would probably never have been mentioned at all.”77 
In this sense, the endeavors of Stead and like-minded colleagues to keep disarmament 
on the agenda only brought into sharper focus the lack of progress made, contributing in turn 
to the disparaging coverage in mainstream newspapers. By August 1907, once it became 
clear that the disarmament question was to be kicked into the long grass, La Petite 
République lamented how only two delegates, Britain’s Sir Edward Fry and France’s Léon 
Bourgeois, genuinely sought peace, hence their conclusion that “the golden age” of peace 
remained as distant as ever.78 Criticisms of the conference were still more vociferous on its 
conclusion in October. A Times editorial, entitled simply “The Hague Fiasco,” considered its 
only redeeming virtue to be the warning it served “against the moral and intellectual 
dishonesty of pandering to sentiment merely because it was popular.” Other journals were 
less vociferous but equally damning. The conference has left “on many minds the impression 
of failure” noted The Economist, while even The Manchester Guardian admitted that it “has 
brought many disappointments.”79 Henri Maran, in Le Matin, was more savage, comparing 
the peacemakers at The Hague to a drunkard proclaiming sobriety: “Those who drink will 
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drink; those who play will play, and those who fight will fight. All the conferences in the 
world will change nothing.”80 In America, the Washington Post resented attempts to ‘foist’ 
the Hague Conference “upon the world as a triumph of peace,” when the proceedings were 
noteworthy only for the “shallowness and humbug” of the resolutions made. It also noted the 
failures in the domain of arbitration, which had been left “on as insecure and unsatisfactory 
basis” as ever before.81 
These negative appraisals were exacerbated by the views of some notable participants, 
particularly the eminently quotable letters of the British delegate, Eyre Crowe. Crowe 
portrayed the meeting as an unnecessarily long and interminably boring affair, punctuated 
only occasionally by anything amounting to genuine progress. His correspondence is also 
notable for Crowe’s often scathing appraisals of his fellow delegates (including his British 
colleagues, Reay described as “both incompetent and crooked”82) and his uncompromising 
attitude towards Germany, the country of his birth. His verdict as the conference closed was 
characteristically blunt. It “is drawing near its inglorious end,” he wrote on October 8: 
“Everyone is heartily sick of it.”83 Throughout the conference Crowe appeared frustrated, 
impatient, and frequently indifferent. His letters betray irritation at being subjected to “the 
most appalling collection of platitudes” regarding arbitration, all the while knowing that the 
likelihood of meaningful results was remote.84 Indeed, by late August, when it appeared that 
the arbitration scheme would run aground, Crowe declared that he only regretted the “waste 
of time and energy.” He had not always exhibited such cynicism; on September 10 he was 
“anxious” to secure agreement on the Prize Court so that “our work shall not, at least, have 
been thrown away.”85  
Indeed, the chances of augmenting arbitration provided a rare opportunity for 
optimism, and much of the impetus here came from the Americans. In early August, Choate 
recalled President Roosevelt’s words at Carnegie’s New York Congress back in April, which 
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described “a general arbitration treaty … increased in power and permanency” as the “most 
important” step that might be accomplished. “It is now six weeks since we first assembled,” 
Choate told the conference on 1 August, hence there “is certainly no time to lose.”86 The 
Americans would thereafter press insistently for progress in this direction, and Choate 
showed little restraint when criticizing the lack of goodwill. “If we have not confidence one 
with another,” he asked, “why are we here? [It was time] to substitute arbitration for war, as 
the world demands.”87 But even this less ambitious scheme struggled to gain traction, to the 
dismay of those delegates less prone to negativity than Eyre Crowe. His colleague, Ernest 
Satow, noted how the Prize Court scheme was received favorably by the First Committee on 
12 August, but thereafter got bogged down in endless discussion and debate. Satow even 
exhibited some Crowe-like skepticism on 26 August when bemoaning how “one hour was 
wasted making no progress.”88 Fry also regretted the lethargy. “I wish that I could tell you 
that things are going well here,” he told Grey on 20 September, “but they are not,” chiefly 
because Germany and Austria were determined to “reduce the results of the Conference to a 
minimum.”89 Choate too succumbed to pessimism by late September. “Everybody begins to 
hope for our release,” he wrote to his wife, “and I now prophesy that we shall not be detained 
here after October 10th – but who can be sure?”90  
But Choate’s pessimism stemmed more from fatigue – and he was well into his 
seventies by now – than genuine disillusionment. Indeed, as the denouement of the 
conference neared he lamented the negative press coverage, especially in Britain. The 
London papers, he noted, which had “always been in an ill humor about the Conference, are 
doing their best to decry its work.”91 In Choate’s opinion, the vitriol of the British press 
stemmed from bitterness. They were so irritated by their failure to maintain British naval 
supremacy “that they can find no good in anything done.”92 The conference closed with no 
progress made in disarmament and no substantial augmentation of the system of arbitration 
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(although the acceptance of the principle of obligatory arbitration was an advance of sorts). 
Even the limited scheme for a maritime Prize Court – which the Conference recommended 
pursuing as an obtainable goal – never came to fruition.93 Regarding disarmament, the 
Conference achieved nothing more than a reaffirmation of the 1899 vœu declaring it desirable 
that governments “undertake again the serious examination of this question.”94  
This is not to say, however, that the conference was without merit. At the very least, 
perceived public pressure ensured that disarmament featured prominently in discourses 
surrounding the conference, even if it was immediately jettisoned once official proceedings 
commenced. In this sense, as Andrew Webster insists, the 1907 conference consolidated 
discussions that had taken place in 1899 to shape “the international politics of disarmament 
for the following half century.” Given that success in disarmament requires “enormous effort, 
good timing and no small degree of luck,” Webster suggests that activists’ expectations at the 
time of the Hague Peace Conferences were premature. After the “cataclysm” of the Great 
War, the landscape had changed sufficiently that policymakers and peace advocates alike 
now shared “a common belief that disarmament was a critical condition of ensuring peace.”95 
But these longer-term legacies were simply unknown at the time, and much of the 
Conference itself, and certainly its immediate aftermath, was spent apportioning blame for its 
deficiencies. For the British, the villain of the piece was clearly Germany, who, along with 
Austria, had stymied all discussion of disarmament and gravely diluted the arbitration 
schemes. As Crowe put it, “Only Germany and her allies who have won the easy triumph of 
preventing anything from being done are heartily pleased.”96 Lord Reay concurred, lamenting 
Germany’s negative attitude and predicting confidently that “when the minutes of the 
conference are published [Britain] shall obtain the approval of liberals in all countries.”97  
Much of the subsequent historiography has reached the same verdict. David Bettez, 
for example, blames German opposition and “the personal antipathy of Kaiser Wilhelm II” 
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for the failure to make any substantial progress.98 More recently, however, Steven Harris has 
contended persuasively that rushing to blame Germany “is to wander down our own version 
of the Sonderweg.” Opposition to arbitration and disarmament was shared by all the great 
Powers – the Germans simply vented it more brazenly.99 Indeed, unlike other powers, the 
Germans can hardly be accused of hypocrisy. The British government, by contrast, can be 
taken to task for proclaiming publicly that advances in disarmament were possible while 
doing little in private to make them a reality. Ultimately, the conference accomplished little 
and disappointed many. As Reay commented, it “has not given any new guarantees for the 
maintenance of peace and has confirmed the fact that the great Powers are constantly 
preparing for war.”100 With this it seemed that the historical legacy of the 1907 conference 
was secured. As Arthur Eyffinger has remarked, the world now “helplessly spiralled down 
towards the abyss.” Nonetheless, Eyffinger has defended the frequently “ignored and 
ridiculed” second conference for providing a “unique exchange of views at a moment of 
paramount interest for the history of Europe.”101  
There is much to be said for this defense, as the 1907 assembly was important despite 
its obvious shortcomings. In size alone it far exceeded its 1899 antecedent. It also increased 
hopes that more regular gatherings would ensue, each augmenting the work of its 
predecessors.102 Furthermore, vindications of the 1907 Conference were articulated at the 
time. Elihu Root felt that the Conference “accomplished a great deal” given the unfavorable 
diplomatic climate.103 Despite acknowledging the absence of disarmament, the New York 
Times warned against concluding that the conference failed. “Small as its specific 
performance has been,” it was noted, “that performance has been full of promise.” Above all, 
it provided a forum in which the “opinions of mankind” could be conveyed, marking a further 
progression away from the “darkness and secrecy of the old-fashioned dynastic and 
diplomatic intrigue.” Further conferences would surely follow, and where the current 
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gathering had failed, a third or fourth would inevitably succeed.104 In France, where 
enthusiasm for disarmament had only ever been lukewarm, post-conference verdicts tended 
to fuse disappointment with a dash of optimism. Léon Bourgeois admitted that the conference 
had not eliminated war, accepted too that no progress was made in disarmament, and even 
acknowledged the limited successes with regard to arbitration; nonetheless, he was convinced 
that it had “extended the rule of law in the world.” For Bourgeois, peace “par le droit” was 
paramount; disarmament must follow, not precede, the implementation of a workable 
framework of international law. Furthermore, he insisted that the French delegation had 
represented the pacifist impulse at The Hague, speaking on behalf of the “universal 
conscience.”105  
Jean Jaurès, writing in the Humanité, also argued that the French delegates were at the 
vanguard of efforts for peace, and asked whether Clemenceau would continue to mock 
Bourgeois and foreign minister Stéphen Pichot as “sheep bleating peace.”106 Le Matin was 
more downcast, commenting on the disconsolate atmosphere as the conference closed. 
Asking what had been accomplished after more than four month’s work, and what changes 
had been ushered in since its first sitting, it concluded that such questions were answered 
“with a smile, a shrug, often even with disdain and sarcasm,” the reality being that conference 
“did not accomplish anything at all.” Nevertheless, Jules Hedeman, who had been sent by Le 
Matin to both the opening and closing sessions at The Hague, refused to be entirely 
disheartened, insisting that the conference had been a “moral” victory despite the absence of 
“immediate practical results.” There had been no limitation of armaments, that was 
undeniable, but Hedeman reminded his readers that the process was ongoing and that future 
Hague gatherings would incrementally deliver the desired outcomes.107 An editorial in 
L’Aurore also evoked hope and despair in equal measure. Acknowledging that the outcomes 
would disappoint the “very optimistic peace propagandists,” it considered it an 
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“exaggeration” to conclude that nothing useful had been done at The Hague. The failures in 
disarmament were considered entirely unsurprising, such initiatives having been exposed as 
over-ambitious even before the conference began.108  
It cannot be denied that the outcomes of the 1907 conference were enormously 
disappointing. As Le Figaro concluded, despite the best intentions of the assembled 
diplomats, “the dream was too beautiful” to be realized.109 The Los Angeles Times concurred, 
asserting that human nature, animated by “selfishness and greed,” rendered peace 
conferences “a dream, not a reality.”110 Choate was thus keen to respond to what he 
considered unjustified criticism. Given the “general disposition in the press of this country 
[the U.S.] and of England to belittle and depreciate the work that was done,” he argued, such 
a corrective was necessary. Falling short of inflated expectations did not mean that nothing 
was achieved. “We cannot expect to succeed all at once,” he continued, “or to avoid war 
altogether, but great progress is being made.”111 Another of America’s delegates, James 
Brown Scott, was keen that various speeches delivered by the American delegation be 
collated and published. Choate agreed, writing to Porter that such dissemination would “go 
far to enlightening the public here on the subject of the work at the Conference in respect to 
which there still seems to be considerable ignorance.”112 A pamphlet of speeches delivered at 
The Hague by Choate, Scott and Porter was subsequently published.113  
Efforts to provide a corrective to the dominant, pejorative perception of the Hague’s 
work were replicated across the Atlantic. At the 1908 Universal Peace Congress in London 
numerous orators reflected more sympathetically on the conference. Lord Courtney of 
Penwith considered it “unjust” to conclude that nothing had been done. “It did much,” he 
insisted, even if progress was lacking in the domain of arms limitation. The American 
pacifist, Edwin Mead, also refused to consider the conference a failure, considering the 
commitment made to hold periodic meetings thereafter to be a significant and meaningful 
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achievement. Others were unwilling to await another Hague conference; G. H. Perris led calls 
for an interim naval conference, and the realization of such a meeting (the 1909/10 London 
Naval Conference) shows that not all momentum was lost in 1907.114 But there is little doubt 
that the overwhelming reaction was, as Mazower has noted, “one of enormous 
disappointment.”115 This was readily acknowledged in pacifist circles. Carnegie concluded 
bluntly that “The Hague has disappointed chiefly because we expected too much – there 
never was a hope of disarmament.”116  
Yet the disappointment transcended the issue of disarmament alone; on arbitration 
too, and internationalism more generally, the conference failed to live up to its hype. The 
internationalists had been, according to Kuehl, “overoptimistic” from the start, their 
aspirations never afforded “serious consideration” at The Hague.117 For Stead, the failure of 
1907 was partly due to the British government’s inability to press its case with sufficient 
force. He insisted to Bryce that Britain should have “forced Germany’s hand” by 
demonstrating clearly their commitment to disarmament. “All of this,” lamented Stead, “was 
thrown away by the miserably absurd fashion in which Grey ran away from his guns.”118 
Stead also defended the record of his Courrier de la Conférence, asserting that it had been 
established “to serve the cause of peace,” and that every one of its 109 issues had 
successfully fulfilled this mandate. As a result, a journal that had initially been treated with 
suspicion at The Hague had gradually evolved into an “indispensable” source of 
information.119 Carnegie also refused to be entirely disheartened, despite acknowledging that 
“expectations were perhaps too high.” “Arbitration has gained,” he wrote to von Suttner, “and 
will continue to gain until it triumphs. Nothing can prevent this.”120  
Carnegie’s optimism was not exceptional. To be sure, the post-1907 disenchantment 
must not be equated with hopelessness or despair – a descent into global conflict was by no 
means inevitable. The networks of transnational peace activists, notably the IPB, the IPU, the 
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Lake Mohonk group, and other organizations that would be formed in coming years (not least 
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the World Peace Foundation, both 
established in 1910) became ever more vocal and organized in their efforts to promote peace 
over war. More publicity, propaganda and education, coupled with more transnational 
cohesiveness and a dash of political will, and even the more utopian aspirations might still be 
realized. If 1899 and 1907 had flattered to deceive, the next gathering at The Hague would 
witness more significant advances. In 1913, Murray Butler encouraged civil society activists 
to take the initiative, noting that practically nothing had been done in this direction by 
“governments who should have acted long ago.”121 Impetus was needed because 
governmental inaction was becoming the norm, heightened by a lingering disenchantment at 
the limited outcomes of the last Hague gathering. As Choate lamented later that year, “the 
nations generally are not inclined to welcome the holding of another conference at 
present.”122 This disinclination owed much to the prevailing sense of disappointment that 
dominated the post-1907 landscape, a disappointment that emanated significantly from the 
exaggerated hopes that had been entertained vis-à-vis disarmament. 
Ultimately, the First World War prevented a third Hague conference from taking 
place (although a group of 1200 women did convene at The Hague in spring 1915 to promote 
a pacifist cause).123 More significantly (from the point of view of establishing 
historiographical norms) the outbreak of war provided a brutal confirmation of the failures of 
the pre-1914 peace initiatives. But the Hague assemblies, along with the numerous meetings 
and congresses held by the IPB, the IPU, the Lake Mohonk group, and others, had given 
global peace activists a platform that was not without influence even as the Great War raged. 
Indeed, as Thomas Munro insists, their efforts ensured that the “language of the Hague peace 
conferences of 1899 and 1907 was widely used to make sense of the war” that now engulfed 
the world. Furthermore, that the two Hague Conferences even met owed much to the efforts 
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of well-connected and energetic networks of citizen activists who could legitimately claim to 
represent a substantial corpus of popular opinion. The problem was, as David Stevenson has 
noted, that public opinion was rarely unanimous, and strong navalist and militarist currents in 
all countries appeared more attuned to the diplomatic and political realities than the idealist 
impulses of pacifists.124 Peace advocacy was vital in getting topics like arbitration and 
disarmament discussed at the highest tables, but there was always a risk of overplaying their 
hand.  
This is exactly what happened ahead of the 1907 Hague Conference. Aspirations of 
what might be accomplished there spiraled — especially regarding disarmament — 
cultivating expectations that could never be met. To varying extents each government went 
along for the ride, but none was prepared to offer what the peace activists wanted, expected, 
and demanded. These crushed aspirations, and the disappointment that permeated the 
networks of peace advocates, did much to solidify an immediate post-conference perception 
of failure. This view was confirmed when war came in 1914, before another Hague 
conference could assemble to rectify the deficiencies of its antecedents. This perception of 
failure no longer holds water, and historians now rightly acknowledge the success that citizen 
activists enjoyed in this period. That this reappraisal took so long to emerge can be attributed, 
at least in part and somewhat paradoxically, to the fact that the activists themselves tabled 
unrealizable demands ahead of the 1907 conference. Ultimately, a chasm existed between the 
bar they had set themselves and the outcomes that were diplomatically possible; by rendering 
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